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  State killings 1982-1990

 


Submission by the Committee on Administration of Justice

DEATHS CAUSED BY RUC/BRITISH ARMY PERSONNEL IN 1990 AND 1991

1) On Saturday 13th January, John McNeill, Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson were shot dead during a robbery of a betting shop. The shop is situated at the junction of the Falls and Whiterock Roads in West Belfast .

had been shot dead. The Panorama team claimed that the RUC hadn't even questioned people about the possible presence in the car of a weapon. Furthermore, those who had been at the scene denied that there had been a weapon in the car. The shooting was carried out by British army under­cover operatives of the 14th Intelligence Company. The official account claims that the undercover unit came across the robbery by chance.

John McNeill was sitting in the getaway car, unmasked and unarmed when he was hit by six bullets, the fatal wound being caused by a bullet fired from a range of less than 24 inches. Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson came out of the betting shop and were shot on the steps. Eye-witnesses alleged that shots were fired into them as they lay on the ground. The autopsy reports confirm this as a possibility and that Eddie Hale had been shot 13 times and Peter Thompson 10 times.

The RUC investigation was completed after some three months, at which time their report was forwarded to the Director of Public Prosecutions who decides whether evidence exists to bring a prosecution. The DPP's office requested further forensic reports.

The autopsy results, commissioned by the Coroner, were not given to the Coroner until some six months after the incident. At that time, the Coroner made the autopsy reports available to the families and their legal representatives.

The DPP decided, in December 1990, that no prosecutions would be initiated against the soldiers who killed John McNeill, Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson.

In July 1991, a BBC Panorama programme investigated a number of recent killings by members of the security forces. The Whiterock killings was one of these incidents. It produced new evidence in the form of witnesses not previously interviewed by the RUC. It also claimed that the decision not to prosecute was based on the RUC's "reasonable belief" that a gun may have been in McNeill's car and was removed from it by those who came to his assistance after he had been shot dead. The Panorama team claimed that the RUC hadn't even questioned people about the possible presence in the car of a weapon. Furthermore, those who had been at the scene deniedthat there had been a weapon in the car.

Because of these development, the DPP has informed McNeill's widow that the case has been re­opened and the the RUC have been requested to carry out further investigations into the incident. As of mid-October 1991, the RUC had still not completed the investigation.

Apart from a decision to prosecute, the only other forum for an examination of the circumstances of the shooting will be the coroner's inquest and any civil proceedings which have been lodged. The inquest will not take place for some time, pending a House of Lords appeal of a judicial review hearing. The issue in contention is whether statements made by soldiers involved in an earlier lethal force incident should be admissible at the inquest. The families are challenging the admissibility of written statements as the soldiers themselves have refused to come to the inquest to face questioning.

This pattern of soldiers and policemen not having to attend inquests was, earlier, the point at issue in a long legal challenge. In January 1990, the House of Lords found that the rule under which army and police personnel were not obliged to attend inquests was valid and protected them from "embarrassment, in circumstances where they may be the subject of criminal proceedings, of invoking the privilege against self incrimination".

The long delays of inquests, added to the judicial review hearings and appeals, has meant that there are currently 39 inquests pending. This backlog probably means that the inquest into the deaths of John McNeill, Eddie Hale and Peter Thompson will not take place for many months.

2) On 18th April 1990, Martin Corrigan was shot during an INLA attack on an RUC man's house in Armagh . The circumstances appear consistent with an ambush by the security forces. There seems to have been an exchange of gunfire. CAJ has no further details.

3) On September 30th 1990 Martin Peake was driving a stolen car late at night in West Belfast . Karen Reilly and Markievicz Gorman were passengers. A British army patrol opened fire on the car, killing Martin Peake and Karen Reilly and injuring Markievicz Gorman. The official account alleged that the car had crashed through a road checkpoint injuring one soldier. Eye-witnesses contest this version saying that there was no checkpoint and that the soldiers opened fire without provocation. No warnings were heard.

4) On 9th October 1990, Desmond Grew and Martin McCaughey were shot dead by British undercover soldiers. Official reports claimed that the men were armed, when they were shot. Grew and McCaughey were members of the IRA acknowledged as being on active service. Later reports raised questions as to whether the men were carrying weapons or whether weapons were found some distance from the men's bodies.

In June 1991, 3 people reported to have been arrested at the scene and charged for possession of weapons had all charges against them dropped.

5) On November 12th, 1990 undercover soldiers shot dead Alexander Patterson, an INLA operative near Strabane Co. Tyrone. The killing took place outside the home of a UDR soldier. Official accounts claimed there was an exchange of gunfire.

This was another incident investigated by the Panorama in July 1991. Panorama alleged that Patterson was a police informer. Furthermore, the programme alleged that after the initial burst of shooting Patterson, who was driving the car involved in the attack, stopped the car and sat waiting for the security forces to arrive. At this point a soldier came up to the car and shot him dead, the programme alleged. It was reported in the Guardian in mid-September 1991, that the DPP had also re-opened this case.

6) On December 30th, 1990, British marines opened fire on a car in disputed circumstances in Cullyhanna, Co. Armagh . Official accounts claimed that the car had crashed through a checkpoint injuring 2 soldiers. This version was contested by eye-witnesses. Fergal Caraher was shot dead and his brother Miceal Caraher was seriously injured.

A police investigation has been completed. By April, autopsy reports had been forwarded by the coroner to the families legal representatives. A story in the Irish News on 1st March claimed that the RUC was recommending a soldier be charged in connection with the shooting. Shortly after the screening of the Panorama programme in July, which claimed that soldiers had been involved in an attempt to fabricate evidence about the incident, six soldiers were charged with a variety of offences. These ranged from murder (1), through manslaughter (3) to perverting the course of justice (6). The soldiers are now awaiting trial.

7) On 10th April 1991, at around 10pm Colum Marks, acknowledged by the IRA to have been on active service, was killed by the RUC in Downpatrick. The official version claimed that he had been killed as he was about to launch a rocket attack on the barracks in Downpatrick. Other reports claimed that the rocket was actually found some yards from where he was shot, suggesting that he was unarmed at the time he was shot. Furthermore, there were suggestions that Marks had been dragged from the spot where he was shot and held for 25 minutes before being taken to hospital for emergency surgery. A copy of the autopsy was released to Colum Marks widow during the summer of 1991. It identified three bullets, one of which caused death, despite an emergency operation to stop bleeding and repair damaged tissues.

8) On the 5th June 1991, three men were killed in a ambush style operation in the village of Coagh , Co. Tyrone. The three men, Michael Ryan, Tony Doris and Lawrence McNally, were acknowledged by the IRA to have been on active service and two rifles were found in the car. The attack was carried out by uniformed undercover soldiers who fired a large number of shots at the car as it drove through the village. The car burst into flames and the bodied of the men were burned beyond recognition. The families of the men claimed that the incident was evidence of shoot­to-kill policy.

9) On 29th September 1991, Kevin McGovern, a 19 year old student, was shot dead by the RUC in Cookstown Co-Tyrone. The first official reports claimed that, late that night the shooting had taken place after McGovern had "appeared to throw something at the police". The RUC themselves retracted that statement later the next day saying that the shooting had been a mistake and acknowledging that McGovern had been an uninvolved and innocent victim. CAJ asked the Chief Constable to appoint an officer from an outside police force to investigate the killing, a call later echoed by other people in Northern Ireland . This report was refused and investigation is proceeding, supervised by the Independent Commission for Police Complaints. The family, meanwhile carried out an independent autopsy which showed that Kevin McGovern had been shot in the back.

On the 4th of November 1991, Gerard McGinn (17) an occupant of a stolen car was shot dead by members of the R.U.C. in West Belfast . The car had reportedly been acting suspiciously and was pursued for several miles. Gerard McGinn was reportedly shot through the head, another occupant was shot in the arm and shoulder. A survivor of the shooting has claimed that the car was stationary when it was fired on and that no warning was given. The R.U.C. after the shooting announced that the incident would be investigated by a Chief Superintendent and supervised by the police complaints commission.

Prepared by Michael Ritchie on behalf of the Committee on the Administration of Justice November 1991

Extract from a submission made by the Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast , Northen Ireland to the United Nation's Human Rights Committee, February 1991.

ARTICLE 6

THE RIGHT TO LIFE: PARS. 61 - 75

The use of lethal force by members of the security force In Northern Ireland : paras 69 - 74

The need for independent investigations: paras 66 and 72.

Despite government claims, incidents in Northern Ireland where shots have been fired by the Royal Ulster Constabulary are not always investigated by a separate police force. Following the Stalker/Sampson inquiry into the so-called "shoot-to-kill" incidents in 1982, the Chief Constable of the RUC said that future such incidents would be investigated by an outside police force. To date, however, this promise has not been acted upon. A 15-year-old boy, Seamus Duffy, was killed by a plastic bullet fired by a police officer in August 1989; an investigation was carried out by the police themselves, but no prosecution ensued. Nor are such incidents involving the Army independently investigated. In the most recent killing by soldiers, that of Fergal Carraher in December 1990, the police are acting as spokesperson for the army as well as investigating the circumstances of the shooting.

Inadequacy of the law. pars.65, 69 and 70

The account in para.69 of the Government's Report on the use of lethal force by members of the security forces is jejune in the extreme. The law on the use of force, as enshrined in section 3 of the Criminal Law Act (NI) 1967, is inadequate to deal with the kinds of so-called shoot-to-kill incidents which regularly occur. The test should be whether force was absolutely necessary to preserve other human life, not, as at present, whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances. The courts have interpreted the present test In a manner which gives much too much scope for the use of lethal force by soldiers and police officers (see Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference (No.1 of 1975) [1977] AC 105 and Farrell v. Secretary of State for Defence [1980] 1 AI 1 ER 166).

  • Consideration needs to be given to whether a wholly new offence should be created, such as "inappropriate or unlawful discharge of a firearm".
  • The police's code for firing weapons should be tightened up (para. 69).

The procedures for investigating deaths caused by the security forces needs to be improved: paras 72 - 73

Soldiers in Northern Ireland use firearms not just when they believe there is imminent danger to life (para. 70). In January 1990, to take just one incident, three men were killed outside a betting shop in West Belfast while in the process of raiding it. One of them was sitting in a car, unarmed and unmasked. According to the autopsy report, he was shot at a range of less than two feet. In December 1990 the Director of Public Prosecutions announced that there would be no prosecution of the anonymous under-cover soldiers involved in this incident. Quite apart from the deplorable nature of the decision, where it appeared that civil servants and the police make the decisions in private rather than allowing the courts to decide in public, there is the added fact of the length of time involved in processing these incidents. Why, for example did it take six months before the autopsy report was completed? Why did it take five months for the Director of Public Prosecutions to come to a conclusion simply on the question of whether there is a case to be answered, after receiving all the relevant materials?

Very few police officers or soldiers have been charged in connection with the 339 deaths which have occurred at the hands of the security forces since the onset of the present troubles in 1969. (Of these 339 deaths, 184 involved civilians, with no connection to any paramilitary group). A tiny number of those who have been prosecuted have been convicted. It seems that it is very rare indeed for a court-martial to take place in the circumstances described here. There is a strong feeling amongst ordinary people in Northern Ireland that the security forces receive institutional protection from the rule of law when involved in incidents where civilians are killed.

Disparity in sentencing: par. 73

Some of the soldiers convicted in Northern Ireland have served very light sentences, thereby encouraging the commonly held view that in official eyes their offences were not serious. The one British soldier to have been convicted of murder, Private Thain, was released from prison after serving less than three years of a life sentence.

Plastic bullets: par. 74

Plastic bullets are used in Northern Ireland in situations where life and property are not seriously at risk. In 11 out of the 14 deaths caused by plastic bullets, army and police claims that the victim was rioting have been contested either by eye-witnesses or by the judge or coroner conducting an inquiry into the incidents.

Nonetheless, the decision taken in March 1990 not to prosecute any police officer in connection with the death of Seamus Duffy did not surprise civil rights activists because, although 17 people have been killed by plastic or rubber bullets, only one member of the security forces has ever been charged in connection therewith, and that police officer was acquitted.

The CAJ views with alarm the government's recent decision to make plastic bullets available to the Ulster Defence Regiment (the regiment of the British army which is locally recruited and is overwhelmingly Protestant). The organisation has published a pamphlet providing information and detailing its concerns on this issue (see CAJ Pamphlet No. 15, Plastic Bullets and the Law, 1990).

Coroners' Inquests

Because of the extraordinary unwillingness of the authorities to bring members of the security forces to court to answer for their actions, inquests have become almost the only legal mechanism whereby victims' families have an opportunity to get information as to the cause of death. However, the rules concerning coroners' inquests in Northern Ireland tend to work against the emergence of the truth.

The differences between the rules governing coroners' inquests in Northern Ireland and those applying in England have been highlighted by Amnesty International (see their report on Northern Ireland , July 1988). A number of points are worthy of note:

There is no verdict in coroners' inquests in Northern Ireland , only "findings". This means that the jury must give only the most generalised account of what happened, but make no observations as to culpability. This situation has been in force since 1981. By contrast, while no indication of civil or criminal liability of a named person may be given, in England and Wales verdicts of "unlawful killing" are permitted. The impression given is that the law works to protect members of the security forces from facing prosecution.

A second factor is the withholding of forensic and other evidence from victims' families and legal representatives. There is no statutory obligation to make forensic, post mortem or witness statement evidence available to families. Because of this, the evidence is overwhelmingly withheld until the inquest actually opens. A welcome departure from this norm came in the case earlier referred to of the three men killed by soldiers in January 1990. On that occasion, the pathologist' s reports were given to the families some six months after the incident occurred. The impression given by this withholding of information is that government is concerned to keep the lid on information relating to the use of lethal force by members of the security forces.

Another factor which prevents a clear picture from emerging is that the soldiers or police officers who kill will not appear at the inquest to give an account of their actions. The only witnesses who appear at an inquest are those called by the coroner; the families cannot call witnesses. A succession of legal battles has resulted in the fact that members of the security forces cannot, in fact, be called to give evidence, even by the coroner: see the decision of the House of Lords in McKerr v Armagh Coroner [1990] 1 AI 1 ER 865, where rules forbidding the calling as witnesses of persons charged with an offence relating to the death were upheld as intra vires. The House of Lords is currently considering a further challenge to the use in evidence of written statements made by persons not called as witnesses.

A final point is that legal aid is not available for families to assist them with legal representation at inquests. This puts families at an immense disadvantage. They are therefore reliant on the goodwill of solicitors and barristers, which, thankfully, has not been lacking. There is often great expense involved in trying to get independent expert advice or opinion. The result is that official evidence is, by and large, hard to contest. The spectacle of, in one case, a family's barrister and solicitor confronting legal representatives of the Northern Ireland Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Ulster Constabulary as well as police forensic experts, state pathologists and other security force personnel (though not the ones who actually fired the shots in question) makes a mockery of the supposed independence and fact­finding remit of the coroners' inquest system.


 
 


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