The O'Malley Papers Insights into the civil war in 1922 - based on previously unpublished republican dispatches

AFTER the Four Courts garrison in Dublin had been bombarded into surrender at the start of the Civil War in June 1922, the republican forces made the fatal mistake of retreating and leaving the capital in the hands of their enemies, thereby allowing the Free Staters to present themselves to the outside world as the lawful government in control of the situation. Throughout July the IRA was consolidating its positions in the country, mainly in the south, with Liam Lynch as Chief of Staff working from County Cork. He had already appointed Ernie O'Malley as his Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, to return to Dublin and 'press guerrilla tactics in Dublin as used against common enemy', ending his communique optimistically with 'God bless our arms'.

O'Malley, as one of the most active republican fighters in the recent British war, was not happy with his new duty, pointing out in a handwritten note to Lynch that:

"I do not know the officers and it will take time to build up a staff, more time to build up Organisation, still more to realize the potentialities of this area. I do not wish in the least to complain, but.. I think I could more usefully serve my country in the field at present than as a third-rate clerk in Dublin, which will I foresee be my ultimate fate. I wish to wipe out my disgraceful surrender of the Four Courts, but it is for you to decide."

In 1922, Dublin resembled modern Belfast, with lorries of troops on the streets, sudden arrests and checkpoints, police raids and brutality. Then the prisons and camps began to fill. O'Malley's time as AACS there coincided with the most crucial stage of the war, when attitudes hardened and sporadic peace moves had no chance of success. He was to be arrested in early November of that year (see his book The Singing Flame), after which Lynch moved GHQ to Dublin and the Northern and Eastern Command (Ulster and Leinster) which O'Malley had commanded was broken up into smaller areas. Until then the following Divisions had been generally under O'Malley's direction: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Northern; the 1st and 3rd Eastern; Dublin 1 (City) Brigade and Dublin 2 (South County) Brigade; and the 1st Midland. From July to November 1922 the war was being pressed with some confidence.

In terms of abuse the ultimate irony was reached when the Free State government, its army, the press, clergy, and consequently the general public, no longer recognised the existence of the Irish Republican Army. It was as though the IRA had vanished overnight, together with any sense that a Republic had been proclaimed and then established by democratic election. The Treaty with Britain had ignored the claims of the Irish Republic, and although the IRA continued to be organised same lines as before and with exactly the same antecedents, they were now to be termed 'the Irregulars'. This name was the most insulting. As resented as when freedom fighters are tagged as terrorists.

The Northern & Eastern Command correspondence and reports of activities and setbacks make up an authentic account of the first months of war when arguably a republican victory could have been possible. The extracts and quotes which follow illustrate a few of the many hundreds of papers that are on file - the great majority of them having landed up in the Free State Intelligence Department for connotations marked in red ink and put into individual files. As he had feared, O'Malley's main occupations were attempting Organisation, communication and ob- taining "stuff" for his beleaguered and bereft Brigades. Liam Lynch was to write to him from Field General Head- quarters (FGHQ) in the South in some sympathy two months after his arrival in the capital:

" I all the time realised the difficult job you have on hand and so different to your activities in the old War days; however, we must all stick where we can be of most service to the Republic."

WITHIN three weeks of his arrival in the city, and while living a hunted existence from one 'safe' house to another, O'Malley wrote to Lynch to give a general report on the Command situation:

From: AACS

28th July 1922

To: C/S FGHQ IRA

1.To acknowledge receipt of yours Ref. No. 20 of the 25/7 received 6pm. I asked for outline of General Policy be- cause we might do things here which might influence general Military policy and also I wanted to know what action we were entitled to take against Civil Administration.

2. O/C Dublin arrested last night. I am arranging to appoint acting O/C tonight.

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4. An . A.S.U. has been started here and has already carried out some actions. I have not received any report as to what they have actually done nor have I received any report from any of the sur rounding areas.

5. Dublin 1 - being slowly reorganised; ,enemy very active and in some cases whole Covs. have been picked up; this cannot be prevented, as the men must go to daily work and there are not sufficient funds on hand to even maintain a strong column or a strong A.S.U. After the armoured train incident very nearly two whole Coys. were picked up the following day round Inchicore district. We will carry on here as best we can but I am afraid we cannot bring the war home to them very effectively in Dublin.

6. Dublin 2 An Officer from Dublin had been appointed to command area; petty jealousy, insubordination and organised opposition have prevented columns which I instructed to operate from doing anything active. I met Officer last night and suspended a member of his staff. I hope things will improve.

7. 1st Eastern I also met Mick Price (O/C) last night. The following will give you a rough idea of what that area can do:

1st Brigade 50 men

2nd 10

5th 20 to 30 men

8th 20 men

7th Have not exact figures but would presume them to be about 100 men

9th 40 men

This comprises the total effective strength of the Div. - in all 250 men. This may be over-estimated. Those are the only men available for even obstruction work, so that you can realise that this area, even if it concentrated its available strength round the Curragh district, would not be even able to obstruct the troops there. Communications between Units in this Div. is extremely difficult and there is some petty dispute, preventing a good officer from doing anything. He could not do much, as he had only three rifles.

I met two officers from 3rd Northern and discussed situation with them. Nothing can be done in Belfast and I await a detailed report from them as to the situation there. I instructed them to reorganise the area and to get rid of all but the best elements there.

4th/5th Northern: I asked Owen O'M and an officer from the 4th Northern to meet me there but they have not done so. If I had things some way fixed up here I could go up to meet them and if I do not hear from them in 3 or 4 days' time I will do so.

1st Northern: Received the following report on the 25th/7 "60 men under Lehane and Daly left Inveigh and are operating in Donegal. " I understand that they are starving and are very much in need of money. I have sent on some and have tried to fix up line of communication with them.

Re. Staff. I now have D/Operations and Organisation, Adjutant, O/C Communications, Q.M., Intelligence, D/Civil Adm. and Finance, D/Pub)icity and D/ Engineering. The latter service has been terribly neglected. Publicity has been pretty ineffective here. The, Adjut. has arranged for the establishment of a Press Bureau and I expect that a satisfactory report will be forwarded.

DURING August, O'Malley's notes of an interview with a Longford Brigade officer (1st Midland Division) described it as an unorganised area:

"There are about is men who cannot go home; acting somewhat as a flying column. On 26th August Lanesborough Barracks was taken by them and 11 rifles, 2 of them Martini Henri (5 not certain), 4 grenades, 1 revolver and 10 shotguns captured. Sir Henry Wilson's house was burned on the day after the two men were hanged in London. Some trains have been held up.
Armament: 18 rifles; a stone of war flour, but no Engineers available.
Organisation: 6 Battalions."

At the time 'A' company consisted of one man, and the O/C of 'B' had been arrested.

An August 24th report to Liam Lynch from O'Malley gave further details of the difficulties yet determination of the N/E Command:

With such a scattered poorly armed Command it was impossible to conform to any strategical plan; we are engaged on the basis of one but so far has been a series of failures but as usual we have hopes.

1st Midland: Am still playing that game of trying to get in touch with O/C but have failed repeatedly. ..' There are men in Longford who would be only too willing to work if they had arms they are some of McKeown's old men.

1st Eastern: The former Quarter-Master has been acting O/C; in fact he constitutes the entire staff and is doing very good work; he is in touch with his area and travels round it regularly...

We have been trying to concentrate on the areas surrounding Dublin and to get them organised in some fashion whilst waiting for Chemicals to turn out explosives. O/C Chemicals was arrested and had given no information to the Q.M. as to where his staff could be located or as to his dumps. However, the enemy has since located his dumps. This Dept. has done practically nothing. We had just put a five-wire in charge when the dumps were captured. All the old Chemical crowd are gone and they were the men who would take risks and who would get the work done.

On September 3rd he wrote to Lynch with better news: "The situation here is pretty cheerful-looking - morale good. The shortage of explosives d grenades is very much felt. The 1st Eastern is certainly doing good work and some junior officers there are to be highly recommended."

On September 6th O'Malley had a long interview with the O/C and Vice O/C of Dublin 2 Brigade (South County Dublin) and obtained details of the battalions, armaments, needs and enemy posts in the area. Dundrum battalion had 10 men, with 2 armed, and dumps could not be located, nor could the O/C or his officers be found. There were 50/60 men in Dun Laoghaire, 8 to 9 rifles, but 18 men could be armed. "There is no one left in Bray. There were 5 up to some time ago, but they had to clear out" The Blessington battalion numbered 50 men, "very much scattered", with some 20 rifles. There were 8 enemy posts in the area.

O'Malley summed up:

Detonators failed to explode in a recent operation. This Area is rather up against it; men are few and widely scattered; enemy is strong, and the people, always nationally rotten, are hostile. it is very difficult to get houses to stay in or to provide dumps.

In mid-September Lynch thought that the Operations Report of the Dublin (City) Brigade was generally "very satisfactory and shows widespread and continuous attacks by our Forces" He particularly welcomed the attacks on British troops and hoped "these will be developed, and become more numerous." He warned that the CID were "so much on the alert and so likely to identify and suspect our men ", and suggested an instruction on this point, especially as "the capture of 11 of our men on the 20th ult. at Kimage 5th Battn. would appear as if they were given away, and at the same time that they themselves took no precautions to guard against surprise."

In fact O'Malley had already sent out a Command instruction on this subject, ordering:

Will you again impress upon them the necessity of protection on the march and at rest. This cannot too often be insisted upon. I was preparing a memo on protection but I have always doubted whether these memos have been put into practice; officers smile when they receive them and immediately go and get all their armed men caught, owing to not putting common sense into practice.

A further general Command report was sent by O'Malley to Lynch on September 24^th:

I met O/C ASU and discussed with him places of operations which could be carried out in Dublin. I will arrange to meet him regularly... The following is an operational review of the various areas:

1st Northern: No local organisation worth speaking of, at least no local organisation to give assistance to the men there. There is a small flying column left in the west of the county (Donegal) and another small one of about 5 or 6 men round about Castlefin area. I did not like, and do not still, to forward you a report received from the area, as it would not do if it fell into enemy hands suffice to say that the local organisation let our men down there. The following is an extract from Lehane's letter: "It is a pity nothing can be done in the 2nd Northern; it is impossible just now, as the Ulster F. Staters are co-operating with the Southern F. Staters here on the Donegal Border. They have helped in trying to surround some of our men who are yet at liberty in that direction. They have lent Joe Sweeney munitions and guns."

3rd Northern: No contact with this area for some time past, as the Postal Strike has held up communications, though previously the O/C Belfast reported that the Northern government were examining correspondence.

4th Northern: O/C 4th Northern has reconnoiter areas which have been attached to his Command for Operation purposes. ...

1st Eastern: Athlone and Longford area are now attached to this Division. There are very few men in any of these areas and the Organisation there is practically hopeless.

1st Meath Brigade: This Bde. consists of a section of about 10 men; the O/C recently escaped from prison; he is a good officer.

5th Mullingar: The Bde. O/C recently escaped from prison. The result, to show how the enemy appreciated him all enemy posts round Mullingar evacuated. This area, if the O/C is spared, will make good.

7th Kildare Bde:O/C Brennan, who was an excellent officer and was very much liked by his men, was captured with Mannion on the night the latter was murdered. His loss will affect the Bde. which he had helped to keep together. The Vice Comdt. who was A.O.C., is willing and the A.O.C. of the Division will see that he makes the area as hot as he can. Athlone area: There is a flying column of 8 men operating in this area. There is certainly man-power available here not to any great extent, but certainly more numerous than in any other area in the lst Eastern Div. This Bde. is very short of arms, especially rifles. If we had rifles we could have a good flying column of about 35 men. I asked Offaly 2 to lend them 6 rifles as the men in this area are very eager and willing to fight.

Longford area: Column armed with whatever rifles were captured in Lanesboro Barracks Not much manpower available here but whatever few men there are very good.

Dublin 2 Brigade: is being steadily depleted of officers and men. It is extremely difficult to exist in this area, as the Staters axe pretty strong here; there is a small flying column in one area. If we had 5 good officers here there are only 3 officers left in the area it would make a terrible change. I have just heard that some of our wounded were carried from Glendalough direction today. There was to have been an attack on a post there so I expect it has been a failure.

1st Eastern improved considerably under its energetic O/C (Mick Price) and by early October he could report that he was reorganising and equipping areas: 'Both 5th Mullingar and Athlone now have machine guns and if somebody is not hit it will be a sad job."

DURING September and October both Dublin 1 and 2 Brigades were able to send in more encouraging reports, samples of which are given below:

DUBLIN 1 9/10/22

To: AACS

On Saturday night last at 8.30pm three men of the ASU were going off patrol. They were passing along Manor Street (on their way to dump their guns) when Free State troops ten in number jumped from a tender and called on them to put up their hands. Our men drew their guns and opened fire. They fired 14 rounds at the enemy and wounded five of them. Those who were injured became very frightened and rushed away from the scene of action in all directions. A British soldier came out of a public house close by and took one of the wounded men's rifles and commenced to use it against our troops. During the progress of the fight one of our men also fired on a car containing British officers which passed by the scene of action. This is the second occasion on which our men going off patrol were taken by surprise and instead of surrendering, fired on the enemy and got clear away. Acting O/C Brigade

HQ Dublin 2

25-9-22 2.30pm

To AACS The

Vice O/C Battn. 2 reports that on Friday last a large party of F.S. troops surrounded Dalkey and district for 31/2 hours. They got nothing. He managed to get his men safely out of the cordon and succeeded in disarming one of their sentries. He was pursued down Dalkey by some officers in a car who opened fire on him. He had two bombs thrown at their car, one of which struck the car and exploded, the other fell behind. He had to retreat as he had now only one rill left for his revolvers. After the search the F.S. forces went in to Dalkey town, threatened to shoot all the men found in the public houses. They spent some time in the town firing numerous shots.

Vice O/C Brigade

DUBLIN 2 Brigade

3.10.22 12 Noon

To: AACS

Now that I have completed your report re. actions etc. in our area, I have decided to go out to the 1st Battn. area for a few days and liven things up there. This area has been inactive lately owing to loss of men and displacement of arms by men in gaol. The total number of men left in this area reaches about only eight and four guns (.45 revs.). I have seen the O/C Battn. I today and made necessary arrangements with him to have men ready to meet me. I propose to:

* Extensively interrupt Telephone, Telegraph & Cable Communications. 10 Destroy Signal Cabin and relative wires Dundrum.

*Destroy Sandyford and Milton P. Offices. 0 Seize P.O. bicycles and destroy P. 0. Mail Cars.

* Seize mails for censoring.

A. O/C

Date: 27/10/22 Brigade Headquarters

Time: 12.05pm Dublin No.2

To: AACS 1.

1. All telegraphic cables were again cut on both sides of Dalkey on the 23rd inst. Wires are being cut so often in this area (almost daily) that large numbers of CID men are engaged watching the district in likely places. However the local Intelligence is fairly active and they are baffled each time. I see by this morning's paper that it is now attributed to irresponsible youths.

2. Two Free State houses were raided i.1 the Clondalkin Area for arms. We were not as lucky on this occasion as on the last. No arms were found.

3. A Sergt. Major of the Free State forces was held up by our men in Lucan and the following taken from him: 1 Smith Wesson .45 revolver, 6 rounds .45 ammunition, 1 Sam-Browne belt and a revolver holster.

4. The guard at the punping station was sniped on the 21st inst. In this case they did not return the fire.

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8. The O/C Batt. 2 reports that for the past two weeks he has had an ambush party out nightly but unfortunately had no luck. Thev seem to be qvnitiino

this area unless they are in force. I have heard from outside sources that the Staters are afraid to go up Dalkey Hill after dark except they are in large numbers. The O/C of this district has certainly cleared them out of this Area. A large force of Staters came to Dalkey Station to guard the Mails daily.

9. Two Free State soldiers who were under open arrest for cutting wires in the Curragh in an attempt to release IRA prisoners have deserted and are now acting with the 2nd Batt. column in the Dalkey area. The O/C reports they are very good men. It is a fact worth noting that up to the present any deserters we have taken on have turned out excerent men. 10. I was speaking to the O/C Batt. 4 last night and he informed me that one of his men in Wicklow town has been sniping Wicklow Barracks fairly regularly for the past three weeks and thought the matter too insignificant to report. He has promised to report everything in future.

Vice O/C Brigade

BY OCTOBER 25th the Acting O/C of Dublin I was reporting:

Bde. Council made arrangements for speeding up the war. The offensive had nearly broken down and one ASU needed reorganisation. I expect good results this week and next. In spite of the bad appearance of things all Battalions have been out looking for work.

Dublin City Brigade was very much isolated and received no proper assistaiice from adjoining Brigades but its acting O/C (his predecessor being in jail) thought: "The C/S seems to have a rather exaggerated idea of our weakness. We are able to attack the enemy, the ambushes being our most effective weapon and the one he is most afraid of "

Lynch had written that the use of grenades should be kept up in Dublin ambushes and urged the derailing of trains and that incendiary bombs be used against the CID (Special Branch) Headquarters. He had also authorised the commandeering of supplies for Active Service Units as "our men must be well clothed, but receipts must be given for any goods taken. " The Dublin O/C confirmed that commandeering had always been taken under order by a responsible officer but added in his report to O'Mallev:

You can quite understand that under present circumstances our men cannot make the inventory right off of the goods they commandeer. The goods often have to He in a dump several days before they can be counted.

FROM July to November 1922 many actions were carried out, or proposed but failed. All Battalion O/Cs in Dublin city received orders from the Brigade Adjutant: 'The AACS has authorised me to raid big Unionist Firms and other Irish Firms in the city, for equipment, which will be useful for our Flying Columns and active Battalions.'

O'Malley was asked by his Command Intelligence: "I have particulars and plans of a fairly soft job requiring about eight men, which if it comes off would bring about f3,000 of enemy Government money into our Exchequer. Have I permission to go ahead with same?" The brief reply was: "By all means go ahead." (Unfortunately it netted a much smaller amount than expected.)

O'Malley had his own ideas on what courses of action to take. On October 3 1 st (after the passing of Special Emergency Powers Martial Law by the non-republican-attended Parliament) he suggested to his Adjutant:

Could you arrange to keep regularly in touch with the President (de Valera). It would be well that we should have his opinion on proposed military action, as it may affect his Cabinet. You might get his opinion on the following: The burning of Murphy's and l,itzgerald's houses [i.e. those of the owner of the 'Irish Independent' and the present Taoiseach's father] ; the issuing of a Proclamation declaring Provisional Government illegal, and that after a certain date anyone attending their Parliament is liable to suffer a Traitor's fate.

De Valera's opinion is. not recorded! Meanwhile O'Malley was writing to Lynch asking again for policy on the destruction of railways, and also:

Lynch replied that "this complete destruction of Rail Communications must be kept up" and requested a memo on the subject of enemy administration as "this would be a vital point on which to attack the enemy." He also wished that "the Provisional Government Offices should be often raided if possible, provided there are not guards on them, and if there are these should be frequently sniped "

The question of railway destruction was often raised, and Lynch wrote to ask: "It is about time the Workers should cease co-operating with the Free Staters, particularly the Railway Workers. What do you suggest should be done to get these from running trains, which are assisting the enemy in waging war against us... " It was not an easy question to answer.

From the start of war O'Mallev had believed GHQ should be in Dublin and at last on September 28th Lynch was considering this:

Do you consider that I should remove my HQ to Dublin, so as to be in direct touch with all matters arising there? You would of course be the best judge there of the importance of being in touch with political, and other matters, and by October 5th he had again thought of moving: "I am considering returning with you after the Executive Meeting and have GHQ in Dublin. (He arrived just after O'Malley's arrest.)

THIS remained a problem and not just for the N/E command. As late as October 21st O'Malley complained to his O/C Communications (Sean Lemass) that: 'The route line to the North is absolutely useless. It takes nearly a week for a despatch to reach Dundalk.' Lvnch advised that he had no covering addresses for the Western Divisions and 'don't consider it safe or wise to use them.'

Dublin Brigade considered organising communications by sea or by use of car firms, and there was a man on the G.N.R. who could bring despatches to Belfast. Lemass reported back: "I have definitely ascertained that it will not be possible to have rail communications with Wexford unless a miracle happens. During the British War only four men on this line would carry despatches and all these four have been arrested. I have got in touch with one man who is stationed at Westland Row but he does not travel except very irregularly to Bray. "

In half-serious fashion O 'Malley finally wrote to Lynch: "I hope you will not keep in any closer touch with me as you threaten because it is difficult enough to reply to you once a week. It has taken 3 days to get time to send this letter off I would give you a lot more information if I had time and if I had means of getting information, which I have to hand, typed quickly."

Hundreds, probably thousands, of these republican communications were seized by the Free State authorities, sifted by their military intelligence and then filed under various headings, including personal files for future jail reference.

Frank Aiken wrote suggesting that Dublin should get B.S.A. .22 rifles and silencers for sniping, "as they would not be heard above the noise of ordinary traffic" and recommended "the double tipped fuse" as it was "easily made and one of them will destroy an armoured car or Lancia without any civilian casualties", but they were not easy to come by. Instead officers from West Clare and 3rd Southern arrived to ask for arms, and O'Malley wondered:

Does the QMG function at all because this Command has received no arms, ammunition, nor munitions of any description from GHQ. I have not pressed the point about supplies, as I have always considered, and still do, that supplies should not be forwarded because a messenger or constant despatches annoys the QM so much that at last, awakened to a sense of duty, he forwards necessary material, but that such supplies should be forwarded on a direct military basis.

THERE was acute shortage in the Command though the South had some to spare. late October the Asst. Director of Engineering complained to O'Malley that he could see no definite work in hand or contemplated, beyond working a duplicator, andcontinued:

" O'Malley had wished to concentrate on engineering but without capable engineers he could only attempt to get some trained in each Brigade area, then send out explosives and "see that they do as much harm as they can with such."

Two days before his capture he wrote in exasperation to GHQ's D/E:

It certainly would not be too much to expect that GHQ should supply us with 3 capable engineers, as it will eventually affect them far more than it will this area. We cannot prevent troops going South if we have no competent engineers. We have very little arms and ammunition and therefore it must be mainly an engineering war in this part of Ireland, but as far as I can see it must be an engineering war without engineers.

IN AUGUST gathering intelligence was still 'pretty tough', ,abut a month later O'Malley could report to Lynch that 'staff is getting in touch with me in in the enemy ranks'.

At the same time Lynch was instructing that no warnings were necessary before spies were dealt with. A Dublin ASU section was suspected of being involved with a robber gang and acting as Free State spies, but the O/C had nothing definite beyond suspecting certain men whom he disbanded. "They were doing nothing and shirking work."
AMERICA

I have already written about getting an order from Sean Moylan for the utilisation of our share of White Cross money. There are TEN THOUSAND POUNDS allotted to us and it could be very usefully employed in relieving prisoners' dependents. Could you please see that Moylan gives me authorisation and I will see that the money is sent out to those in need. The 3rd Northern (Belfast) wants it particularly.

Other Americans were ready to give a different kind of support, as O'Malley heard from Austin Stack in October:

I have had a letter from Joe McGarrity (USA). He tells me there are some friends of ours over there willing to come to Ireland at their own expense to help. He does not give any particulars but I dare say some are ex-Army men. I met many fine fellows of this sort when I was over and they expressed themselves as ready to fight over here. I do not know whether we could use them but the presence of a few here and there might have a good moral effect. Some too might be experts at engineering or other work.

The following is a quotation from a reliable Northern source: 'It seems Churchill told Devlin that we could exterminate each other in the South if we liked, but if the North is touched by either side England will wipe out the 26 counties otherwise they won't interfere.'

Lynch responded that "War must go on against those who are preventing our Independence in the North, especially those who are out to exterminate our people there. We must of course concentrate on enemy who is immediate to us. I would like to have Aiken's view. "

Of the 5 Northern Divisions, Frank Aiken's 4th was the strongest and "up against North and South". O/C 5th Northern informed O'Malley that "the morale of the men is very good" and wrote on September 28^th;

Organisation in the Area is very good and I think it can be improved after a while. Of course it is a little different to the last fight but that can be got over. In this Division there is a good number of the old IRA who are doing work in one way or another, that are not joined in the Army. We call them B men.

All the men I had first stood loyal to the Republic... They are fully confident of victory no matter what the sufferings are. The people are very good in certain areas and a good few have turned over to the side of the Republic. I think that we are getting on very well. I believe that this will be a long drawn-out fight and will want to be fought with tact. I think there should be a general policy to cope with the Civil side as well as with the Military side.

3rd Northern covered the Belfast area. In August O'Malley had to tell Lynch that he had not heard from them for at least three weeks, but by the end of the month he had met their Intelligence Officer and "had fixed up some kind of a satisfactory working arrangement with him: his area is very hard up; I could not keep him supplied with sufficient money to run Brigade and supply wants of Prisoners' Dependants and men out of work there."

Lynch replied: "I note the unsatisfactory state of affairs in this area. It is too bad how the Dail, and old GHQ, let down our people in the North, articularly in Belfast. I fear we cannot come to their assistance financially."

On October 30^th the O/C Belfast Brigade wrote to O'Malley following "my interview with you" and indicated Organisation was in hand:

I am sending L/W the Arms list for the Brigade. Adjutant is also enclosing list of units in Brigade. I visited Co. Down yesterday and have linked up an outpost company of 8 men in the Ballynahinch area. I am trying to link up with 4th Northern by following lines...

The outpost Coy. referred to has control of 1 Vickers Gun and about 10 service rifles with some thousand rds. of ammunition. Exact report is to be made to me shortly. A Brigade officer will visit Castlewellan in the near future to link up a few men there (2 have already been reported O.K.). I am arranging for Organisation of Antrim County also.

But it was the 1st/2nd Northern, based in Donegal and commanded by Sean Lehane and Charlie Daly (who was later to die a Drumboe martyr to the Free State) that had to struggle most. O'Malley had informed them that "there is no IRA Organisation as such in Fermanagh" and queried whether they should go to the West or be "used as a base for operations against the Northern Imperialist Government. " He heard frequently from Lehane between August and October as their position worsened and extracts from despatches reveal something of their desperate situation:

O'Malley to Lynch 24/8/22

I heard from Lehane yesterday, I sent him some money today. Of the 115 armed men belonging to the original column about 25 are left. The country is rotten, even young girls and boys carry information and the priests exhort the people to go out of their way to spy on us... he sent down a special message to me for stuff but I could do nothing.

O'Malley to Lynch 3/9/22 I

met messenger from Lehane he is reduced to 20 armed men. The majority of the unarmed men there seem to be of poor stuff. There is a very big enemy force in the County [Donegal] and they are very active. I have sent him on some money.

O'Malley to Lynch 22/9/22

I do not know if we have had many casualties in the I st/2nd Northern, as the only despatches I get are appeals for munitions and money. O'Malley to Lynch 24119/22 They are in even a worse condition now than they were when you received the last note. Communication is cut off with the 3rd Western whatever communications they had by sea is cut off and they axe absolutely isolated.

O'Malley to Lehane 26/9/22

I have asked O/C 4th Northern to establish contact with you; I have also asked him to forward you supplies of munitions and he has promised to do so.

... To my mind nothing effective can be done in Donegal, yet, at the same time, if you withdrew it would probably have a bad effect on the remnants of the Volunteers there. I expect your courier will explain things which I am unable to write you...

Towards the end of October O'Malley heard that Lehane intended to leave and return south. As Lehane wrote:

What would you advise re. Organisation etc. here after we leave? We had just decided going on the run properly as we have to go six or seven miles by night to get a house to stay in. Daly thinks West Donegal hopeless, and he has asked to leave it before it is too late, so I have written to him calling himself and his men off this way.

Perhaps after a little case here it would be possible to organise local help. Get us mines and Electric apparatus etc. and start again in the near future. The Staters may ease off and become less vigilant after a time.

THE PRESS

THE TWO main unionist pap ers in Dublin, the Irish Times and Freeman's Journal had reluctantly acknowledged the Free State, but by now they almost approved of those ex IRA men and Sinn Fein members who had abandoned 'terrorism' and were being supported by Winston Churchill and the British press.

The conservative 'native' paper, the Irish Independent, had been fiercely opposed to the Easter Rising in 1916 and was true to form in 1922. The Independent had welcomed the Treaty wholeheartedly and so its campaign was bitter against those Irish 'murderers', 'looters', 'bank robbers', 'criminals', who were endangering the life of the new state by waging armed revolt, O'Malley wrote a letter to the paper from his secret Dublin HQ and somewhat surprisingly it was published (although censored).

The Free State Army's official publication, An t-Oglac, reacted angrily with a long editorial on 'Mr. Ernest OMalley's recent letter to the Independent":

The Dail was not consulted before this war was launched. Quite true. The Irregular leaders did not consult An Dail before they seized Irish public buildings, looted Irish property, kidnaped an Irish General, and notified England that the Truce (sic) made with her by An Dail was at an end...

The letter, as it appeared in the Independent, had been blue-pencilled by the editor. Mr. Childers' propaganda sheet now supplies the blanks, which are nothing less than a threat of assassination against the editor and proprietors of the Journal. Would this be called a "war measure" by the new idealists?

The semi-official government paper, The Free State, to which ministers including Eoin McNeill often contributed, also editorialised on O'Malley's letter in which he had referred to 'a just and holy war' and defended republican tradition:

... this orgy of death and destruction is perfectly plain to everybody but the mutineers themselves. ...Some of the Republican warriors are even starting in business on capital acquired from nowhere within the last few weeks.

...This is not a war for the Republic; it is a rebellion against the Treaty. It is not holy; it is criminal. It is not just; it is unjustifiable. There is no Republic to be defended, and the oath of allegiance sworn to it by a fraction of the Irish people has no longer any binding force over a single soul.

Liam Lynch instructed that hostile papers should be seized and destroyed, and the ASUs did manage to burn some at tram and train stations, but Free State guards protected the printing and distribution houses. At the same time Lynch asked if An Poblacht was allowed to be printed and sold freely. Clearly even by late September the South did not have an accurate idea of the capital's way of life! Lynch also referred to newspaper bias in military matters:

A considerable number of operations are not being reported in the Press, especially those which result in our favour. ... In those "Sweeps" the captures reported are altogether misleading, everyone they arrest they describe as "Irregulars" though the vast majority are civilians whom they release again in a day or two. In Clare, for instance, 35 "Irregulars" were reported as being captured, whereas only 6 were our troops, the remaining being ordinary civilians whom they picked up to swell the numbers.

and on October 5th he asked O'Malley: "You did not inform me what steps you took with regard to Newspaper Editors there, or the effect of them. Lately the stuff being published is as bad, if not worse than ever."

Meanwhile O'Malley had reported on the republican press: The Poblacht concentrates on F.S. atrocities, ill-treatment of prisoners etc. F.S Propaganda has a similar tendency; the result is that the Nation as a whole is utterly discredited on the Continent, as witness an extract of a letter from Art O'Brien whom I had seen D.P about asking him to publish an English "Bulletin "."

The effect of all the propaganda and counter-propaganda on the two sides has, generally speaking, been to discredit the name of Ireland in the outside world. The outside world no longer takes any interest in us. It would be a thousand times better to concentrate our efforts entirely upon establishing a position at home and when we have reached some sort of success in that direction we might then think of interesting others in our case. "
ARMY AND POLITICAL PARTY/ PEACE TALKS

IN SEPTEMBER 3rd O'Malley advised Lynch that 'there is a considerable amount of peace talk going around in Dublin now. I expect you are in touch with de Valera and that no authorised statement will be made without the sanction of both of you. Feelers have been thrown out in Dublin and people have tried to get in touch with me, but I have informed them that they must deal with you or Mr. de Valera.'

He made his own position clear a few days later:

Peace talk and peace negotiations must be definitely hit on the head. The Army, I think, should be in closer touch with the Political Party there is a war on and the services of the Political Party should be at our disposal.

Lynch acknowledged by despatch on September 7^th:

So many private and unauthorised individuals are engaged in endeavouring to bring about Peace on various terms, and are putting forward so many different proposals, that it is necessary to inform all these individuals that the only body on our side competent to consider any proposals or terms submitted to us, or to put forward terms on which Peace may be concluded, is the whole Army Executive.

He hoped that "yourself and A.S. [Austin Stack] are seeing D [de Valera] " and again stressed that only the Executive would decide. "..In the meantime waste no time in pushing the War ahead. " A meeting took place on September 8th and O'Malley reported back: "The Political Party had decided not to go to the meeting of Parliament. ...I found D [de Valera] not too optimistic. I will arrange to keep regularly in touch with him in future."

Lynch, too, was suspicious of the Political Party's motives (i.e. de Valera's Sinn Fein) and warned:

Besides, the Army has its mind made up to total separation from England; I do not think this also can be said of Party.

O'Malley to Lynch on 24/9/22:

We consider it imperative that some sort of a Government, whether a Provisional or Republican Government or a Military one, should be inaugurated at once. It is essential to fight the illegality of the Provisional Government and for this purpose a Legal Committee is necessary. It is necessary to tackle the food question, Transport, Land and Civil Administration. ...The question is, can we get on without a shield of Civil authority or Civil departments at the very least. We ought to make an immediate decision as to whether we want co-operation from the Politicals..

. On September 21st O'Malley received a long letter from the A.O/C of Dublin I Brigade and next day replied on the matter to Lynch: "I have referred anyone who has suggested peace to you as being the competent person to deal with such. I saw Monsignor O'Hagan [of Rome] today. He asked for an appointment and I thought it best, as he had been in touch with Mulcahy, to meet him. I told him that we could win militarily and that his proposal of a truce to discuss negotiations would not succeed."

He summed up his position:

"It has a very bad effect on the morale of the troops to hear any kind of peace negotiations are in progress, as they have learned, from experience, to dread them more than war."
CATHOLIC CHURCH

IN LATE OCTOBER the O/C of the 1st/2nd Northern Division, probably the hardest pressed in Ireland, put a bitter question to his AACS:

What does GHQ decide on for dealing with the priests, etc.? I had a note from C. Daly who is in West Donegal during past fortnight, in which he states that the Confessionals are used for getting information. Youngsters are scared into giving information to the clergy, etc. In East Donegal (where we are at present) the Protestants are by far our best friends, the reason being I suppose that they are free from Church tyranny.

O'Malley concluded his replying despatch with:

Re. priests: it is very hard to issue any drastic instructions to deal with such. I'm afraid we will have to leave them severely alone. The Catholic Church as a whole had officially backed the new State just as it had previously backed the British union) and on October 13th a solemn pastoral was issued from Maynooth College where the Bishops had assembled:

... The guerrilla warfare now being carried on by the irregulars is without moral sanction, and therefore the killing of National soldiers in the course of it is murder before God; the seizing of public and private property is robbery; the breaking of roads, bridges and railways is a criminal destruction; the invasion of homes and the molestation of civilians a grievous crime.

The republicans were put under General Excommunication and forbidden the use of the Sacraments but the majority of them had their minds made up and they resented the use of religion for adverse political purposes. If they must die excommunicate, they were ready to die without a bishop's blessing. Not for the first or last time the foes of republicanism misunderstood their convictions. Sir Horace Plunkett of the landed Irish gentry wrote from Dublin to give his opinion to John Dillon, a leading constitutional nationalist':

The last pronouncement of the Bishops of your Church appeared to me to be a remarkably fine and courageous document. I wish it could have come earlier. The next few days will be highly critical.

'Loyalist' Catholics have always been amongst the worst enemies of Irish republicanism and a memo sent to O'Malley indicates this:

3 copies of .the Catholic Herald (Irish Edition) have reached me. They are full of scurrilous stuff of which the enclosed are specimens. I suggest you take action. A circular to this paper's advertisers warning them to dissociate themselves from these libels or take the responsibility for inflaming the F.S. troops would have effect. Anyhow you'll know best.

The man who I believe is most responsible for this filthy stuff is P.J. O'DriscoU of 147 N.C.R., brother-in-law of the late M.C. [Michael Coffins]. The Dublin offices of the paper are at 68 Mid Abbey St. Dublin which is near the Independent offices (and the guard) on the opposite side. I send a whole issue of this paper as well as marked sheet so that you may get a list of the Advertisers. P OG
MURDER GANGS AND PRISONERS

BY AUGUST, O'Malley calculated that 'roughly 65 to 70 percent of Dublin 1 had been arrested, with 90% of the officers gone. Vacancies in Officers' ranks filled but of course with inexperienced men and before they have time to settle down in their new positions they are arrested.' His new Director of Chemicals and the man in charge of munitions was also arrested, and most of the raw material captured.

Later: "The late D. Munitions [Sean Russell] escaped from Longford and is now with us. He is a Godsend and I expect that we shall have some return from this Branch." And to Liam Lynch a month later: "I was regularly in touch with the late O/C 5th Battn. the engineering Battalion [Dublin 1]. He was captured recently and is a very big loss to the Brigade. A new O/C has been appointed and will take up duty immediately."

Near the end of October Scan Russell's munitions premises in Gardiner Place were suddenly raided, three of his men arrested and all the machinery lost. 'Although the loss of this shop and staff is a great shock to the department, we can still carry on." Russell reported.

O'Malley wrote about escapes to Lynch in his weekly reports, sometimes ironically: "The chances of escape of those 2 men mentioned are about equal to the escape of a 'celluloid cat with wax legs chased through hell by an asbestos dog' The DIO is giving this matter of escapes his best attention. Meanwhile elaborate plans were being drawn up for a mass escape from Maryborough jail (now Portlaoise prison).

Around the end of August started a grimmer aspect of the war the deliberate murder of republican prisoners on the streets or in the barracks by Free State soldiers or more deliberately by the CID (Special Branch ancestors) who were soon labelled 'the Murder Gang'. As O'Malley reported to Lynch:

Recently, there were two Fianna boys and a Dublin Brigade Officer murdered. On the night of 31st ult. two other men have been murdered. It looks as if the F.S. are going to concentrate on Murder Gangs in the Dublin area. So far we have been able to keep the men in hand, but I doubt if Officers will be able to control them if the Staters continue this work.

Lynch replied:

These murders of unarmed Officers of ours in Dublin are terrible and show to what an awful pass the enemy has come to. M must take action to have a stop put to this at once. This game won't be tried much in the Country, I bet, although O/C Signals Cork 3 was murdered after arrest on the way to his mother's funeral. Publicity, and the distribution of plenty special leaflets or pamphlets broadcast over Dublin would help to expose these crimes.

And again:

That public shooting of members of A.S. Units on the streets must have been horrifying to population but all this is bound to re-act on enemy.

O'Malley commented:

Their Murder Gang is not producing the desired effect from their point of view. ... already we know of a few members of it but it is very difficult to get them, but, of course, we will get the whole bunch eventually.

A Dublin battalion O/C hoped O'Malley could

'get this attack followed up at once by the shooting of a few of the most prominent political CID men. Their morale must be injured by last night's affair but that will hape been largely ineffective unless it is made quite clear that the IRA are determined to put them out of business. Last night's attack means war on the CID; therefore it should be followed up. If it is alright to blow 'em up, it is altight to shoot 'em down."

A Sunday morning ambush on two top Free State prison governors only just failed:

O'Muirtuile was struck by the grenade on the head and his cap was knocked off. Grenade did not explode until it had rolled off his head and fallen on to the roadway. The devil's children, etc. A. O/C Bde.

In response to the Murder Gang activities, O'Malley sent out one of his last Command orders before his own gunbattle capture:

Please obtain from O/Cs of areas in the Command a list of Officers, NCOs and men who have ill-treated prisoners, or who have acted on the Murder Gangs. The names of such persons will be circulated to all Units in the Command and they will be instructed that they are to be shot on sight. Included in the list will be McKeown, Lalor and Emmet Dalton.

CONCLUSIONS

O'MALLEY was captured in a gun-battle with Stater troops that nearly killed him in November 1922. Gradually the republicans lost their 'War in Defence of the Republic'. The last despatch from O/C 1st/2nd Northern to Ernie O'Malley gives some sad insight into the reasons for that defeat:

You mentioned to leave men to carry on in an organised capacity. Well I think we have left no stone unturned in that direction but the people don't want a Republic. They want money and case. We are trying to organise still but only those we have already will work. What do you think should be done? The only other plan I can see is if we could go in twos and threes and snipe the enemy, but our Southern accents sell us, that is all.

I got a query from your ADMS re. medical services here. There is none, and there is no doctor going to lose his job for us. We set up a sort of hospital first but it was raided, wrecked and the patients made prisoners and the nurses badly abused. Many years later Ernie O'Malley wrote down the story of a man who was 'given away" twice and commented:

This is the way a deadly secret is kept in Ireland; but I do not see why the name of either a spy, a traitor, a coward, a torturer should be kept among a litany of saints: we have had too damned much of that in Ireland, so much so that each generation made its failures in resistance by trusting the sons of informers or spies or weaklings, when they thought them honest men. Surely it would be common sense to admit that in every generation since the Conquest the Irish by treachery helped to make it a Conquest.

That treachery still continues

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Reprinted from IRIS December 1984